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Creating a multi-layered representational ‘package’ for subcontracted 
workers: the case of cleaners at Ben-Gurion University 
 
Abstract  
Research into the organising of subcontracted workers tends to focus on how such campaigns 
contribute to union revitalisation, the shortcomings of non-union organisations in comparison 
to classic unionism, and opposition rather than complementarity between strategies. Analysing 
the organising of subcontracted cleaners at a university, this article shifts this focus, evaluating 
the campaign in terms of how it assisted the workers, regardless of whether it contributed to 
union renewal, and in terms of complementarity between new and traditional IR actors. 
Drawing on the power resources approach, it asserts that collaboration across different ‘paths 
to representation’ can create a multi-layered representational ‘package’ in which different 
organisations with different power resources take on different aspects of what was once a 
(single) union’s role, covering each other’s shortcomings in a kind of de facto representational 
‘division of labour.’ 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Subcontracted workers have long been recognized as a significant group within the category 
of contingent and precarious workers. This form of employment is increasingly widespread, 
creeping into professions previously considered bastions of ‘classic’ employment forms 
(Gumbrell-McCormick, 2011; Hannan et al., 2016; Wright, 2013). Standard representation 
within unions is particularly difficult to achieve for subcontracted labour due to the ‘triangular’ 
employment relationship, where the wage payer (the legal employer, the service provider) is 
not the employer in practice (the institution paying for the services) (Davidov, 2015).  
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Many studies have investigated attempts to overcome the barriers to organising 
subcontracted workers, including coalitions between unions and non-union civil society 
organisations (CSOs). Such ‘new actors’ in industrial relations (Heery and Frege, 2006) have 
been recognised as having an important role in areas in which, for various reasons, unions are 
weak (Osterman, 2006; Heery et al., 2012). Likewise, the importance of community organising 
and ‘community unionism’ has been noted, along with new configurations of solidarity and 
power resources under changed circumstances. However, the dominant question in these 
studies is to what extent such organising contributes to the revitalisation of organised labour. 
Moreover, an important focus common to many of these studies is the friction between union 
aims and strategies and those of CSOs involved in a given campaign. The possibility that 
apparently contradictory aims of different organisations may complement each other in 
improving employment terms for those at the heart of the struggle – the subcontracted workers 
– has often been overlooked. In light of these emphases, this study has two objectives: (1) to 
shift the focus decidedly towards the workers, evaluating the organisations involved in terms 
of how they assist those they claim to represent, regardless of whether the struggle contributes 
to union renewal; and (2) to shift the focus onto the complementarity between organising 
strategies and between the organisations involved, and thus investigate the relationship 
between classic IR actors (Dunlop, 1958) and new (Bellemare, 2000; Heery and Frege, 2006). 
The study analyses the organising of subcontracted cleaners at Ben-Gurion University 
(2007). The case offers an excellent opportunity to compare different ‘paths to representation’: 
The cleaners were represented by, though not members of, a large established union (the 
Histadrut) but organised by a non-union Coalition for Direct Employment, which recruited a 
small new union (Koach Laovdim) in its efforts to obtain a concrete employment relationship 
directly with the university. In addition, four years after the Coalition’s initial campaign, the 
Histadrut reached industry-wide collective agreements which also covered the university 
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cleaners. I compare the three main entities involved (the Histadrut, Koach Laovdim and the 
Coalition) in terms of (1) their structural position in labour relations; (2) the frameworks 
through which they operate and their limitations; and (3) the level and type of participation 
they offer to the workers at the heart of the issue – the cleaners. My purpose is not to discuss 
union revitalisation or the decline of union power, but to investigate how three different ‘paths 
to representation’ compare and complement each other, each offering a different advantage to 
the cleaners, and creating between them a kind of de facto ‘division of labour’ in the 
representation of contingent workers. I thus respond to Tapia et al. (2015: 176) who urge us to 
explore new claim-making routes in industrial relations (IR), routes which ‘might very well be 
the new reality for worker representation where unions have at best coalition roles, a minor 
role, or no role at all.’ 
Empirically, this case enables a close comparison between three organisations working 
in different ways towards the same broad goal, which enriches our understanding of the 
complexities of contingent worker representation. On a theoretical level, it responds to 
concerns over issues of empowerment and inclusion, and counters the widespread unionist 
approach which tends to evaluate coalition-based organising in terms of union revitalisation, 
often overlooking the benefits of concrete gains for specific workers and over-emphasising the 
clash of interests between unions and other CSOs. The article asserts that collaboration across 
different levels of representation, through different approaches, and drawing on different power 
resources, can create a multi-layered representational ‘package’ in which different 
organisations take on different aspects of what was once the union’s role. Given the weakened 
state of unions facing ‘hard choices’ when resources are scarce (Gumbrell-McCormick and 
Hyman, 2013), the ongoing difficulties of ensuring the basic rights of precarious workers, and 
increasing disruptions to ‘standard’ representational frameworks, this kind of multi-layered 
approach should be seen as an effective strategic option, and not as a poor second to classic 
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unionising. Thus this article contributes to our understanding of ‘what to do when the [IR] 
system approaches collapse’ (Turner, 2004: 3). 
In order to clarify this ‘division of labour’, I will discuss the various organisations’ roles 
according to the power resources approach (see Wright, 2000: 962; Silver, 2003: 13-16; Dörre, 
2011: 18-22) This approach is presented in the first section, which reviews current literature 
on organising contingent labour and highlights the shift in focus that this article attempts. The 
following section outlines the case and the Coalition’s role, after which I explain the efforts of 
the Histadrut to improve the lot of subcontracted workers. I then compare the roles of the three 
main organisations involved (the Coalition, the Histadrut and Koach Laovdim) in terms of a 
‘division of labour’ where each organisation takes on a different aspect of what a union might 
be expected to do. Finally, I discuss the findings and summarise the central claims. 
This analysis is part of a larger project investigating organised labour in Israel. Details 
of the case were gleaned primarily from media and secondary sources, plus interviews with 
key figures: community organizer Orna Amos, among the leaders of the organising initiative 
(interviewed 16 Dec. 2013); and Ami Vaturi, among the founders of Koach Laovdim 
(interviewed 1 Dec. 2013). 
 
2 ORGANISING SUBCONTRACTED LABOUR  
Subcontracting refers to ‘the practice of using intermediaries to contract workers, whether 
through temp agencies, manpower agencies, franchises, or other multi-layered contracting’ 
(Shamir 2016: 232). A notable feature of subcontracted labour is how it enables employers to 
skirt labour law, collective agreements and unions. As subcontracted worker numbers rise, 
undercutting ‘standard’ employment and unionised workers, there is an increasing trend for 
unions to tackle the issue (see Heery 2009). However, subcontracting makes union work 
particularly challenging, because workers are easily replaced; because it is not always clear 
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who the bargaining partner should be – the ‘real’ or the legal employer; and because the 
bargaining unit is often difficult to identify (Shamir, 2016: 232-4).  
Cleaners, among the most noticeable of subcontracted workers, were the focus of some 
of the first new forms of organising which tried to overcome the hurdles faced by ‘classic’ 
unionism. The now famous Justice for Janitors campaign revealed the potential power of these 
new forms (Erickson et al. 2002). A central characteristic of the campaign was representation 
on a community-wide basis, rather than vis-à-vis individual employers, and thus a 
reconceptualisation of the employer-employee relationship. The value of appealing to the wider 
community has been noted in other cases, such as living wage campaigns (e.g. Hannan et al., 
2016; Lopes and Hall, 2015). Wright (2013: 289) notes that the living wage campaign in the 
UK ‘entailed protest action against banks, universities, hospitals, museums, hotels and 
government authorities,’ effectively widening the circle of responsibility beyond the immediate 
employer. These broad-based campaigns aim ‘to bring people of otherwise disparate views 
together on an issue of fundamental importance’ (Lopes and Hall, 2015: 212). Vosko et al. 
(2013: 2) note how such campaigns are often a ‘hybrid of groups with shared concerns,’ 
characterised by ‘a mixture of participatory community and worksite based organising.’ 
Similarly, studies have focused on union coalitions with non-union organisations and civil 
society groups as one important strategy (e.g. Tattersall, 2005; De Lara et al., 2016; Alberti, 
2016). Indeed, such coalitions have become a central component of social movement unionism 
(Walsh, 2012; Schenk, 2003).   
However, notably, many such studies focus on union efforts to revitalise, and community 
organising and coalitions are viewed as a revitalising strategy (Holgate, 2015b). The approach 
of such studies includes a re-examination of traditional union concerns within new contexts 
and new organisations: Tapia (2013), for example, investigates the importance of 
organizational culture to member mobilization. Others have studied solidarity building and 
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securing power resources (Simms and Dean, 2015) or the importance of a ‘collective action 
frame’ (Ross, 2007), including the use of ‘public dramas’ to redefine ‘particular labour disputes 
into broader violations about what is considered just and fair’ (Chun, 2005: 487). Nonetheless, 
their main concern is how unions engage contingent workers, and a central research question 
is to what extent such organizing assists in revitalizing unions (e.g. Nissen, 2004; Ross, 2007; 
Holgate, 2015a; Simms and Dean, 2015; James and Karmowska, 2016; Alberti, 2016). As 
Tattersall (2005: 97) has it, ‘Union-community coalitions are seen as a mechanism for 
advancing union power by developing powerful alliances in order to rebuild unions’ political 
and economic influence.’ Missing from such accounts is an evaluation of campaigns in terms 
of benefits to the subcontracted workers, regardless of their value to the union or to unionisation 
in general. 
Where unions are compared with non-union organisations, the common refrain asserts 
that non-bargaining actors (community organizations, advocacy groups) cannot ‘provide the 
advantages of traditional collective bargaining’ (Givan, 2007: 829) – these ‘autonomous, 
diverse’ groups ‘lack the institutional capacity to negotiate with or pressure the state (or indeed 
a political party) in a concerted, or unified manner’ (Givan, 2007: 850). Moreover, among those 
who ‘favour the collaboration between unions and CSOs there is a tendency to emphasise the 
opposition rather than complementarity between their organising strategies, overlooking the 
benefits of mixing the two models or the limitations of using community organizing alone’ 
(Alberti, 2016: 76; see Holgate, 2009). 
Following Alberti’s (2016) lead in focussing on complementarity, and to address the 
overemphasis on union renewal, this study explores the possibility that apparently 
contradictory aims of different organisations may lead to a de facto ‘division of labour’ 
between them in efforts to improve employment terms of subcontracted workers. In other 
words, it investigates the relationship between classic IR actors (Dunlop, 1958) and new actors 
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(Bellemare, 2000; Heery and Frege, 2006), asking whether and under what conditions they 
might collaborate successfully and turn the fragmentation of representation into a strategic 
asset for the workers. Therefore, this article shifts the focus (1) towards the workers, evaluating 
the organisations involved in terms of how they assist those they claim to represent, regardless 
of whether the struggle contributes to union renewal; and (2) onto the complementarity between 
organising strategies and between the organisations involved in the struggle. In addition, the 
case under study offers an exceptional opportunity to compare different ‘paths to 
representation’ as three distinct entities were involved in seeking to improve the employment 
terms of the subcontracted workers. 
 To arrive at a concrete conception of the roles filled by the various organisations, I will 
draw on the power resources approach (Wright, 2000: 962; Silver, 2003: 13-16; Dörre, 2011: 
18-22). According to this approach, unions can utilise various types of power: Structural power 
is related to the ‘location’ of workers; possession of scarce skills increases workers’ 
marketplace bargaining power, while a strategic position in the production process increases 
their workplace bargaining power. Associational power is related to membership numbers, but 
members can be passive; therefore this is linked to organizational power – an active 
membership “cultivating and synthesizing” the social capital of members (Gumbrell-
McCormick and Hyman, 2013: 31) and nurturing internal democracy. Institutional power refers 
to the structures, frameworks and organizations which “fix and to a certain degree legally 
codify basic social compromises” (Dörre, 2011: 21). Lastly, moral (discursive or 
communicative) power involves “a conception of social and societal change and a vocabulary 
which makes this conception persuasive” (Gumbrell-McCormick and Hyman, 2013: 31).1  
                                                          
1
 Gumbrell-McCormick and Hyman note two more power types: collaborative (coalitional), which I prefer to 
think of as strategy; and strategic (or logistical), meaning the smart deployment of resources, which I do not 
directly address here. 
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3 THE CASE: THE UNIVERSITY CLEANERS  
The number of people in triangular employment relationships in Israel is notoriously high. 
Though exact figures are hard to come by, in 2010 it was estimated to be 7-10% (Amos and 
Baharav, 2012: 114), after some 30 years of steady increase. Moreover, the campaign discussed 
here should be seen in the context of a general and widespread fragmentation and 
decentralisation of representation, and the undermining of a once extremely robust 
neocorporatist IR regime (Kristal and Cohen, 2007; Mundlak, 2007). Government-backed 
moves to weaken organised labour from the 1980s onwards were part of this process, which 
included the development of labour contractors instead of employment services to place 
workers (Davidov, 2015: 6-10; Maor, 2012: 47).  
The case concerns some 250 cleaners at Ben-Gurion University in Israel, employed via 
two subcontractors (service providers).2 The cleaners have ‘typical’ contingent worker 
characteristics as documented by many studies, particularly those which focus on migrant 
workers (e.g. Fine, 2006; Holgate, 2005). Though the workers were formally citizens, most 
(about 85%) were new immigrants and lived in the Negev area, a generally deprived and 
relatively poor region (Amos and Baharav, 2012: 115).3 Many were employed for nine months 
then laid off during summer recess, a practice which has implications for certain wage-related 
benefits that are dependent on seniority, and labour law violations were common.  
                                                          
2
 Due to space limitations, only the basic outline of the case is presented here. Further details can be found in 
Amos and Baharav, 2012, and Davidov, 2015. 
3
 Note that ‘immigrants’ in this context means Jewish immigrants to Israel, as opposed to non-citizen labourers 
often discussed in migrant labour research. They are citizens, but still contend with many of the issues faced by 
other migrant labourers.  
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  Due to historical collective agreements, the cleaners were represented by the New 
General Federation of Labour (the Histadrut), Israel’s main general trade union, a powerful 
organisation which controls worker committees in key industries and maintains good links with 
the political establishment (see Preminger, 2013). They were not Histadrut members, but paid 
it an ‘agency fee’ for benefiting from its collective agreements. However, they said they had 
turned to the Histadrut for help on a number of occasions, but each time the cleaner involved 
had been fired; they were therefore certain the Histadrut was colluding with their employers 
(Amos, interview). 
 The initiative to act came not from the cleaners, but from students and faculty who had 
discussed subcontracted labour in a seminar in 2005. Some then joined the rights organisation 
Tzach (Hebrew acronym for ‘social justice’), and began pressuring the university to demand 
that the subcontractor pay the cleaners a better wage and social benefits (Amos, interview). As 
the campaign progressed, other groups and organisations joined, forming what became known 
as the Coalition for Direct Employment for Cleaners, with the new aim of securing direct 
employment. This Coalition then expanded its campaign to lobby government and local 
government representatives, and later also other workplaces using the triangular employment 
relationship.4 
 At first, those involved in the initiative did not intend to unionise the cleaners, and 
communication with the cleaners was limited (Amos, interview). Moreover, some cleaners 
were wary of talking to student volunteers involved in the initial campaign for fear the Histadrut 
would hear of it and they would be fired (Amos and Baharav, 2012: 117). By 2007, the campus 
demonstrations and the media attention they attracted appeared to have had an effect, and the 
university insisted the subcontractors increase the cleaners’ wages, but one subcontractor said 
                                                          
4
 The Coalition included representatives of organising initiatives in various universities and colleges, student 
union representatives, lawyers’ groups, social change organisations and women’s organisations. 
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he could not meet the new wage demands and would fire the 100 workers he employed. This 
led to a spontaneous one-day strike.5 Under the Coalition’s tutelage, a temporary workers’ 
committee was set up, and some basic demands formulated, including the demand for direct 
employment with the university, which the university rejected. However, it did agree to 
increase its payment to the subcontractor to cover the wage increase, to keep the cleaners on 
throughout the year, to appoint a complaints commissioner, and to supervise payslips. The 
cleaners who had been given notice were reinstated (Amos and Baharav, 2012: 116). 
This mobilising attempt faced the kinds of difficulties familiar to those who have 
organised other contingent workers. They tend to work alone in physically dispersed locations 
around campus; they are mostly new immigrants with poor comprehension of the local 
language; they have little knowledge of the laws protecting them or channels for redress of 
problems; and they tend to see workplace problems as one-off issues, not as part of some larger 
struggle (Bernstein, 1986: 411). The first steps towards the strike did not stem from any 
understanding of labour relations or of options for action sanctioned by law or IR norms, but 
were an almost instinctive response to the news of dismissal (Amos, interview). As Nisim and 
Benjamin (2010: 230) observe, subcontracted employees ‘can only become a party in labour 
relations negotiations under the aegis of solidarity from other social forces (e.g. consumers 
and/or activists) that provide alternative humanising sources.’ Most significantly in this 
campaign, the knowledge required as well as the solidarity and social status necessary for 
generating public pressure and a media ‘buzz’ were supplied not by the cleaners but by student 
and faculty activists. These activists are part of the ‘negotiated order’ (Strauss, 1978) and were 
able to direct the cleaners’ grievances into channels unfamiliar to the cleaners, such as the 
workers’ committee and demonstrations on campus.  
                                                          
5
 The strike was therefore also illegitimate, because Israeli law requires a ‘cooling off’ period of 14 days between 
the declaration of a labour dispute and the start of a strike, but the strike was never challenged on these terms.  
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Following the agreement with the university, most of the cleaners considered the issue 
closed, and all but one committee member stepped down. But student and faculty activists 
decided to organise the cleaners within a more formal structure, and suggested they join either 
the Histadrut or Koach Laovdim, a small new general union with just a few thousand members. 
Due to their mistrust of the Histadrut, the cleaners chose Koach Laovdim. This union, founded 
in 2007, has a reputation as young, ‘trendy’ and well-connected to many civil society 
organisations. It emphasises its democratic structure and has rapidly attracted public support 
especially among those who see the Histadrut as a fossilised leftover from a previous era (see 
Harpaz, 2007). The union began negotiations towards a collective agreement, but the main 
drive for the campaign continued to be the Coalition (Amos, interview). An agreement was 
reached, but just a couple of weeks later, the subcontractor changed. The cleaners were taken 
on by the new subcontractor, a direct result of the campaign, and the workers’ committee 
organised with Koach Laovdim became mostly a ‘presence on the ground’ ensuring there were 
no violations of labour rights (Vaturi, interview).  
 
4 THE HISTADRUT 
Histadrut efforts to protect subcontracted workers began only relatively recently (Bernstein, 
1986). Its first decisive step to limit the spread of the triangular employment relationship came 
in 1996, when it worked with Knesset members to pass the Employment of Workers by 
Personnel Contractors Law. The law’s significant shortcomings were partly redressed by an 
amendment in 2000; however, the application of this amendment was repeatedly postponed till 
2008 (see Davidov, 2015: 6-7).  
 Another significant step came in 2011, when the Histadrut called a nationwide strike 
over subcontracted labour. This strike was a huge show of force, involving union members at 
the ports, railways, ministries, local authorities, courts, public companies, universities and 
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hospitals, amongst others. The result was two collective agreements, one for the public sector 
and one for the private (‘business’) sector, which improved the employment terms of many – 
though not all – subcontracted labourers, but failed to put an end to this form of employment. 
In the public sector, employment terms were improved and the number of labour law inspectors 
increased, though the state (the largest single employer of subcontracted labour; Nisim and 
Benjamin, 2010) refused to take on more than a symbolic number in direct employment. As 
Davidov (2015: 13) notes, this was a significant development: ‘for the first time the government 
agreed, under pressure, to sign a collective agreement with the Histadrut that does not concern 
government employees, but rather the employees of subcontractors engaged by the 
government.’ The private-sector agreement allowed for a greater number to be take on directly, 
but only if they work at least 90% of a full-time position, and only after nine months, which 
was already stipulated by the 2000 amendment to the 1996 law.  
 From the cleaners’ perspective, the most significant failing of the Histadrut’s collective 
agreements was that they did not put an end to the triangular employment relationship. 
Moreover, as Davidov (2015: 12) has argued, an extension order in 2013 (which ensured the 
Histadrut agreements covered all subcontracted workers) further legitimised this form of 
employment. Another problem is enforcement: the majority of the workers covered were not 
involved in the campaign and are not Histadrut members; they take no part in workers’ 
committees or other union frameworks, which means there is no on-the-ground presence to 
ensure the agreements are upheld.  
  
5 THE HISTADRUT, KOACH LAOVDIM AND THE COALITION COMPARED 
Both the Histadrut and the Coalition used pressure beyond the specific employer, or employers 
of contract workers in general, to bring about change. As Davidov (2015: 14) has argued, the 
Histadrut ‘had little bargaining power to impose an agreement on the contractors, given that 
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the cleaners and security workers are highly dispersed and mostly nonunionised.’ For this 
reason, it took advantage of the structural power of its members and focused its efforts on the 
government, as the largest user of subcontracted labour, successfully demanding that an 
extension order be included within the agreements.  
The Histadrut made efforts to improve employment terms, but accepted that a certain 
number of workers continue to be subcontracted. It drew on its considerable organisational 
strength (in the form of powerful worker committees in key industries, who can mostly be 
relied on to do the leadership’s bidding as long as this does not clash with their own interests) 
and its leaders’ personal connections with industry and political figures (see Preminger, 2013) 
to pressure the government and private-sector employer organisations to agree to 
improvements in employment terms. The Histadrut was able to do this because of the 
legitimacy it still enjoys as Israel’s largest general union with an historic standing (see Shalev, 
1992), whose committees remain powerful despite many successful attempts to weaken 
organised labour in many sectors (Gutwein, 2012; Harpaz, 2007; Maor, 2012). The continued 
legitimacy of the Histadrut’s status is reflected in the fact that its role in the negotiations was 
‘unusual and even legally questionable,’ as Davidov (2015: 13) says, considering that it has 
‘no formal status as the legal representative of the various contractors’ employees.’ Thus it 
lacks official bargaining power vis-à-vis the employer but skirted this basic unionising issue 
(Shamir, 2016: 232-4) by addressing subcontracting employers ‘as a whole’. In this way it also 
avoided the problem of having to define a bargaining unit.  
 However, the Histadrut made no effort to include the cleaners themselves in the 
campaign, and signed ‘over their heads’. It used classic union tools, including a strike and 
collective negotiations with the traditional social partners, drawing on its institutional power to 
work within the norms of Israel’s IR, but could not formally extend the participatory and 
democratic aspects of these established norms to a very large worker population. In other 
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words, the unionising assumption noted by Shamir (2016: 232-4), that the union and employer 
are repeat players in negotiations, and must take both short and long-term considerations into 
account, is particularly relevant for the Histadrut. Rather than being a source of strength for its 
support of the cleaners, this ‘repeat player’ status limited what the Histadrut could do, as did 
those same ties to the establishment and those same historically-engendered norms: the 
Histadrut draws legitimacy from its status as a dominant state-sanctioned organisation bearing 
‘national responsibility’ for the economy and is favoured by the labour courts in recognition of 
this role (Mundlak, 2007); it must take this into account when it decides to press on any 
particular issue (see Preminger, 2013 for an analysis of this limitation on the Histadrut’s 
freedom). In Frege and Kelly’s (2003) revitalisation terms, the Histadrut tended towards a 
partnership strategy combined with political action at the top of the organisational hierarchy, 
and was unable to act at the ‘shop-floor’ organising level.  
 Koach Laovdim had none of the advantages of historic ties with central figures in 
government and industry, and could not draw on a base of powerful worker committees. Its 
position in Israeli IR is thus weaker, but it can draw on the norms of unionism including legally-
sanctioned collective action such as strikes, and enjoys the privileges granted to worker 
organisations as above other CSOs. In other words, it enjoys the privileges of institutional 
power that are to a large extent vestiges of past labour-capital power balances, in Dörre’s terms 
(2011: 21). Most significantly, Koach Laovdim provided a democratic framework for the 
participation of the cleaners as workers – it adopted an organising strategy and developed 
organisational power. The democratic structure of Koach Laovdim is in stark contrast to the 
Histadrut’s top-heavy decision-making structure, which allows the leadership to sign 
agreements regardless of the wishes of the workers affected. Moreover, through the Coalition’s 
recruitment of Koach Laovdim, the specific labour dispute – those particular cleaners in that 
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particular university – was granted a central position in the campaign. This centrality might 
well have been lost had the campaign continued with only non-union organisations.  
 On the other hand, while Koach Laovdim did bargain vis-à-vis the (legal) employer, its 
moral power to do so was drawn from the Coalition: without the publicity and solidarity stirred 
up by campus activism, the employer could have resorted to familiar anti-unionising tactics 
available to those employing subcontracted labour. Moreover, it was the Coalition’s activities 
which made the cleaners at that specific university (as opposed to all subcontracted labour, all 
subcontracted cleaners, or all employees of that specific subcontractor, for example) into a 
recognisable bargaining unit. Through the Coalition’s activities, the cleaners became a group 
of workers as opposed to disparate individual cleaners. Thus Koach Laovdim was no less 
dependent on the Coalition than the Coalition on Koach Laovdim.  
 The Coalition drew on a kind of power – discursive, moral – which had no formal 
anchor in IR structures. It relied on feelings of solidarity and public (and media) acceptance of 
its view of injustice to generate pressure through lobbying and naming-and-shaming. The wide 
range of organisations within the coalition are accustomed to influencing policy-makers 
through raising awareness in the general public, with the aim of changing policy and pushing 
through corrective legislation (a political action strategy, though different from the 
Histadrut’s). As such, they are unencumbered by the norms of collective labour relations and 
unconcerned about future relations with employers. The Coalition’s focus is on the triangular 
employment relationship as a social injustice, and the specific workers at the heart of the 
campaign – the cleaners – participate not as workers in a labour dispute but as concerned 
citizens, granted no special consideration as the workers directly affected. Indeed, they are not 
required to participate at all: the campaign may go ahead without their input or acquiescence, 
as it did at the beginning. So while the Histadrut tried to improve the employment terms for 
those in triangular employment relationships, and the Coalition tries to put an end to such 
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relationships, neither offer a framework of participation privileging the workers at the core of 
the issue. The premises of unionism, in particular the democratic structures and the 
participation of the workers, were marginalised; the labour dispute between specific workers 
and employer (both legal, the agency, and in practice, the university) was pushed aside. 
 However, while not providing any specific channels to participation, the Coalition did 
assert the status of the workers as members of the community. More than simply representing 
the workers, or mediating between employer and employees, the Coalition drew on ideas of 
community organising to include those excluded but present (the cleaners) into the community 
(the campus community). Importantly, the Coalition was able to engender a new framework 
for solidarity in creating a community around the campaign and thus granting these ‘non-
citizens’ (formally citizens but lacking workplace recognition and voice) some kind of 
citizenship at the communal level (Davidov, 2015: 29). Through appealing to the wider 
community, activating committed students and faculty, and effectively widening the circle of 
responsibility beyond the immediate employer (see Wright, 2013), the Coalition created ‘a 
communal sense of obligation to support collective action’ (Heckscher and McCarthy, 2014: 
629) – it made the cleaners’ issue a community concern. This is a different form of activation 
than that traditionally undertaken by unions, and relied not so much on shared interests but on 
a mutual obligation born of a sense of social injustice – a ‘stronger glue’ than common interests, 
Heckscher and McCarthy (ibid.) suggest.  
Indeed, in their discussion of solidarity, Heckscher and McCarthy define this moral 
appeal, which focuses obligations around a common cause, as one of the two ‘pillars’ on which 
solidarity rests. The other ‘pillar’ is daily social relations; these were created through the 
regular activities involving both the cleaners and others present on campus. This pillar was 
entirely absent prior to the campaign, since the cleaners worked isolated and mostly unseen, 
not present as workers. Its efficacy is reflected in the fact that the plight of those cleaners 
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continues (as of July 2016) to be an issue for students and faculty on campus: through this 
campaign, despite its shortcomings, the cleaners have been brought into the negotiated order 
(Strauss, 1978), they have become a ‘presence’ (Sassen, 2002). This transformation is 
exemplified by one of the campaign’s small victories: getting the university to agree to turn on 
the air-conditioning when the cleaners arrive in the morning, instead of waiting for students 
and faculty (Vaturi, interview). This was a major step in perceiving the workers as human. 
Table 1 summarises the differences between the three entities as presented above. 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
6 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
From this analysis, a picture emerges of a ‘division of labour’ in representing subcontracted 
workers and improving their employment terms. Each of the three entities adopted different 
strategies and drew on different sources of legitimacy and power, with their own limitations, 
and to a considerable extent ‘covered’ each other’s weaknesses. The Coalition was crucial in 
flagging the plight of the subcontracted workers as a social issue, and in developing 
community-wide solidarity and a discourse of injustice. It did not initially focus on traditional 
frameworks of collective labour relations, and a union was not even the first option in seeking 
redress for workplace injustice, but was ‘recruited’ at a later stage. Indeed, the Coalition 
fashioned a workplace issue into an issue of social injustice, and brought it into parliamentary 
political and civil society circles, beyond the frameworks of standard IR. In doing so, it 
developed a political awareness among apolitical workers who feared large domineering 
institutions such as the Histadrut, while simultaneously contributing to goading the Histadrut 
into action by putting the issue on the public agenda. 
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While the Coalition acted in one workplace, and has since expanded its activities into 
other workplaces where subcontracted labour is common, the Histadrut was able to reach the 
entire industry, bringing the weight of existing workers’ committees to bear on government 
and private sector subcontractors, which Koach Laovdim was unable to do. However, its power 
resources – particularly its historic and personal links with government – and its commitment 
to ‘responsible’ unionism and national interests create a democratic deficit. This democratic 
representation gap was filled by Koach Laovdim, which also provided the framework (based 
on existing laws and norms) for concretising the efforts of the Coalition. This aspect becomes 
more clearly significant when this case is compared with the similar organising efforts analysed 
by Wills, who noted that the lack of union involvement ‘made it harder for workers to 
recalibrate their day-to-day workplace relationships and exercise their employment rights’ 
(2009: 457).  
This ‘division of labour’ picture is important in light of common critiques (in classic 
unionist terms) of non-union organisations: ‘By “contracting out” the protest to other actors in 
civil society, community organising risks employing ‘extra-workplace’ sources of power to the 
point of bypassing those directly concerned, whose specific demands and needs risk remaining 
in the shadow’ (Alberti, 2016: 87). Indeed, in the Coalition studied here, the organising was 
very dependent on an educated milieu of students and faculty at what is considered a relatively 
left-leaning and activist academic department, plus the skills of activists in the participating 
organisations. The strength of the Coalition had little structural foundation: change was brought 
about through public pressure, ‘naming and shaming’ the university, while the broader 
campaign which has since developed is focused on the lobbying efforts of the various 
organisations involved. It relied on social capital (in Bourdieu’s terms), tapping into the moral 
conscience of the already-privileged, in contrast to the power resources mobilised by 
‘traditional’ unions which were rooted in the social relations of capitalism. This raises 
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questions of empowerment and equality: where unions offered an egalitarian framework for 
workers to take at least some control of their own working lives, the Coalition risks becoming 
something akin to top-down assistance and thus perhaps offers only a transient, reversible, 
respite from precariousness. 
Yet Jenkins (2002) observes that the ‘objective’ situation of workers may preclude real 
change even if they are organised, and he sharply critiques the ideals of empowerment: ‘Our 
failure to consider objective conditions when initiating the [organising] campaigns comes back 
to haunt us, as ‘member power’ is increasingly relegated to the ideal realm of symbolism and 
rhetoric’ (2002: 58). In emphasising the failings of non-union organisations, we risk forgetting 
that the power of a campaign does not necessarily reside with people who ‘should’ (in unionist 
terms) have it (2002: 73). Though the workers may be most familiar with the conditions 
requiring redress, the critical information and ability to effect change is not necessarily held by 
them (2002: 75), as in this case when the Coalition appealed to university students and faculty 
– ‘elite sources of power’ in Jenkin’s (2002: 59) terms.  
The ‘division of labour’ outlined in this analysis suggests that efforts to change an 
exploitative employment situation can be made simultaneously on a number of unconnected 
and even potentially competitive fronts (competition, for example, between the unions), thus 
enabling participation and voice for the relatively powerless workers yet still drawing on 
sources of power which are not rooted in or even have any link to the employment relationship. 
From a union renewal perspective the cleaners’ campaign was unsuccessful: the Histadrut 
gained no power (no new members), merely relying on existing power to improve the lot of 
the powerless, and Koach Laovdim was left with a weak and uncommitted workers’ committee 
and very few new members. Yet from the workers’ point of view, it was successful, increasing 
voice and participation in the workplace, increasing public awareness of the ills of 
subcontracted labour, and subsequently leading to two industry-wide agreements which 
20 
 
significantly (albeit imperfectly) improved employment terms for subcontracted workers in 
general.  
In short, such ‘divisions of labour’ could be consciously considered by organisers when 
power resources are not clearly available (or are difficult to build up) within one organisation. 
However, what is available will depend on the specific context (including IR system and 
norms) of any given case and will affect the kind of strategies adopted, the kind of coalition 
efforts to be made and the kind of coalition partners to be sought. In this case, the Histadrut’s 
historical position and (the perception of) its past activities with employers meant it was ruled 
out as a coalition partner. Koach Laovdim, in contrast, was an ideal partner within the context 
of an increasing awareness among the general public of socioeconomic issues which, among 
other things, led to the social protests of 2011 (see for example Rosenhek and Shalev, 2013) as 
well as to the establishment of Koach Laovdim itself. Where the Histadrut is seen as part of the 
establishment and known for its collaboration/partnership with employer organisations, the 
new union intentionally set itself up as a plucky and more adversarial counterpart, with its 
activists linked to NGOs. These broad union characterisations also suggest that a ‘division of 
labour’ could help resolve the tensions some have noted (see Heery, 2002; Preminger, 2013) 
between the partnership and organising approaches to union revitalisation, or in broader terms, 
the ‘sword of justice’ versus the ‘protecting vested interests’ roles of unions (Gumbrell-
McCormick and Hyman, 2013: 32). Moreover, the character of a union is dependent to a large 
extent on the relationships that unions have developed with other societal actors, as 
‘intermediary organisations’ (Müller-Jentsch, 1985), which indicates that we can also think of 
this ‘division of labour’ as a division of relationships: while Koach Laovdim focused on its 
relationship with its members and the employer, the Histadrut focused on the government and 
the Coalition on civil society and ‘public opinion’ (see Gumbrell-McCormick and Hyman, 
2013: 2). 
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Concerns about the sustainability of the power configurations of non-union campaigns 
are well-founded, and relevant to this case also. Each actor draws on particular sources of 
power and is vulnerable in different ways to having that power undermined. Nonetheless, the 
act of organising along different paths, bringing in different actors to ‘fulfil’ different aspects 
of voice, participation, representation and protection, enables a mutually supportive 
configuration that bolsters the power resources of each actor. While a given configuration may 
be dependent on activists and volunteers to keep it together, as opposed to a traditional union 
which enjoys a privileged position in labour relations, an optimistic view suggests that issues 
which have developed within a specific (labour) context can become the beacon around which 
concerned citizens, unions and other organisations congregate. In this way the struggle for 
social change can be reconnected with the workplace, as activists take advantage of the legal 
tools and institutional structures which privilege organised labour to promote a wider agenda. 
This case is thus quite different from many other cases of CSO representation of labour, which 
are explicitly not based in the workplace and for whom labour issues are often a “by-product” 
of a wider agenda (e.g. Osterman, 2006). 
To summarize, this article highlights the possibility of collaboration across different 
frames of reference and different approaches, and the possibility of (perhaps the need for) 
overlapping paths to representation, such that each organisation involved brings its own 
particular aspect of representation (its own particular advantages) which do not necessarily 
contradict or undermine that of other organisations, creating a multi-layered representational 
‘package.’ The analysis suggests that new actors in IR can develop relationships with 
traditional IR actors, overcoming the tensions between CSOs and unions and creating 
“mutually beneficial coalitions” (Heery and Frege, 2006: 602), and thereby access vestigial IR 
frameworks. In light of unions’ current straits and uncertain future, the ongoing difficulties of 
ensuring the basic rights of the ever-increasing groups of precarious workers, and increasing 
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disruptions to ‘standard’ representational frameworks, we should consider this kind of 
collaboration as an effective strategic option instead of as a poor second to union revitalisation. 
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 Histadrut Koach Laovdim Coalition 
Position in Israel’s 
IR system 
 Strong  Historic status  Strong ties to employer 
organisations and State 
bodies/government  Advantages of 
privileged position of 
labour organisations 
 Weak  No major workers’ 
committees in key 
positions  No historical ties  Advantages of 
privileged position 
of labour 
organisations 
 
No privileges 
Limitations/ 
considerations 
affecting options for 
action 
 Past and future 
agreements  Laws and norms of 
collective IR 
 Past and future 
agreements  Laws and norms of 
collective IR  
Unencumbered 
Participation of 
workers at heart of 
dispute 
None As workers through 
democratic organisational 
structure 
As concerned citizens, 
activists (if at all); as 
‘members’ of the 
community 
Power resources 
drawn on 
 Structural   Institutional  Organisational   Institutional  Organisational  Moral 
 
Table 1: Summary of differences between the three organisations 
 
